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Abstract
The welfare of modern societies has been intrinsically linked to wage labour. With
some exceptions, the modern human has to sell her labour-power to be able reproduce
biologically and socially. Thus, a lingering fear of technological unemployment features
predominately as a theme among Artificial Intelligence researchers. In this short paper we
show that, if past trends are anything to go by, this fear is irrational. On the contrary,
we argue that the main problem humanity will be facing is the normalisation of extremely
long working hours.
1. Introduction
The most common view on the impact of intelligent machines1 is best captured by ex-Sun
Microsystems’s ex-chief scientist paper (Joy, 2000). Joy quotes Kaczynskis “Unabomber
Manifesto” (Kaczynski, 2005), which works from the premise that the rise of intelligent ma-
chines will result either in a vast portion of humanity being exterminated or being relegated
to “pets”2 and tries to identify an alternative future for mankind. Kaczynski’s positions of
the lower strata of humanity being exterminated is dubbed “exterminism ” by Frase (Frase,
2011) and understood as a possible outcome (among a total of four) of the future of hu-
manity. The argument on why something like that would happen more or less goes along
these lines; since machines can do a man’s work, a portion of humanity will be superfluous.
That portion of humanity will gradually and naturally die off, as it will no longer be able
to sell their labour and hence acquire the means to survive.
In this paper we will defend a somewhat opposite hypothesis - the proliferation of intel-
ligent machines will actually increase the number of labour hours, at least until the point
where one can get machines that can replace men in their totality and reproduce as cheaply
as humans.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: we gradually build a case for a historical
trend in increasing working ours in section 2, while we envision a possible future in Section 3.
We close with a short discussion in section 4.
1. We will use the “intelligent machines” to include all kinds of intelligent algorithms as well as their
physical manifestations.
2. The pet theory is captured nicely in Ian Banks’ “Culture” series.
c©2016 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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2. Machines and Labour
2.1 Job Automation
The introduction of ever-more automated machinery into production has been identified
quite early on. Aristotle claimed that humanity will be forever in need of slaves, unless ma-
chines come to be that could anticipate their master’s desires (Aristoteles, 40BC). Chapter
5 of Marx’s Capital is full of anecdotes and commentary on the use of automation in man-
ufacturing and how it displaces and disciplines workers, using vocabulary that would be
instantly recognisable to anybody doing research in the field today. More recently (Bright,
1958), we have seen scales of automation that take into account Aristotele’s element of
anticipation. Indeed, if you combine human-like intelligence and action versatility with re-
production costs lower than a human, there is a case for an “exterminism” scenario - though
there is still an argument to be made about machines that are fully obedient (Caffentzis,
1999, 1997). Given that it is not clear when such human replacements will be available3,
what is a more pressing questions is to try and speculate what happens to humanity before
this end-point is reached.
In order to better define the quality of machines that are to be expected, we will use the
Bright’s scale (Bright, 1958), as quoted in (Braverman, 1998). We present a modernised
version of the scale with 3 more additions (group 1/ levels 18,19,20) in table 2.1, to reflect
machines with social mastery abilities. Current factory automation is usually at Group 4 -
they perform some routine tasks without taking any kind of feedback into account - possibly
with some newer factories at Group 3. A large amount of labour in modern societies happens
at level 6 and 5, i.e. human controlled tools and machines that perform repetitive motions.
Apart from the intelligence/automation level, one has to also take into account the
reproductive qualities of machines. Designing machines that can self-reproduce is hard
to be imagined when the overall technology level is at level 6. From level 2 onwards, it is
possible to imagine machines that have elaborate control mechanisms that can create copies
of themselves4. This would be the equivalent of a factory machine that bears drills, ovens
etc, effectively turning manufacturing into a form of farming. Machines of capabilities up
to group 4 are indeed in direct competition with workers for wages. On an equal footing, all
a worker can do is compete on time and adaptability ; more office and managerial positions,
jobs resulting from entertainment (e.g. mining gold in virtual environments for rich patrons,
pornography, reality shows) (Graeber, 2013). This can be combined with more traditional
jobs in mining and textiles where automation is possible, but the labour costs so low that
it is pointless to replace anyone. On par with the above, a trend can also be seen in the
creation of insecure, low paid jobs with no career prospects, dubbed the secondary labour
market (Dickens & Lang, 1986).
3. The author speculates that machines with human-like qualities are at least 100 years away.
4. Note that a marketeer that uses some kind of software to perform analysis and A/B tests uses a level 6
tool.
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Group Level Level of mechanisation Control Type Type of
machine
response
1
20 Creates social needs and fulfils them
Game-theoretic
Creative
Social
actions
19 Anticipates social needs and adapts
18 Anticipates human needs and adapts
accordingly on social contexts
2
17 Anticipates action required and ad-
justs to provide it Closed-loop
Online Planning
Closed
large
actionset
16 Corrects performance while operat-
ing
15 Corrects performance after operating
3
14 Identifies and selects appropriate set
of actions
Partially
Closed-loop
Fixed
actions
13 Segregates or rejects according to
measurement
12 Changes speed, position, direction
according to measurement signal
4
11 Records performance
Open-loop
Closed
actionset
Sensor
outputs
10 Signals preselected values of mea-
surement (includes error detection)
9 Measures characteristic of work
5
8 Actuated by introduction of work
piece or material
Man
Open-Loop
Fixed
actions
7 Power-tool system, remote controlled
6 Power-tool, program control (se-
quence of fixed functions)
5 Power-tool, fixed cycle (single func-
tion)
6
4 Power tool, hand control
Man Variable
3 Powered hand tool
2 Hand tool
1 Hand
Table 1: Levels of Automation - the argument raised here is that the higher the automation
level, the more a machine looks like a plant or a beast of burden - reaching human
like qualities only at the very top.
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2.2 Labour Hours
Identifying historical trends in labour hours among different societal strata is hard, given
the scarcity of data in the field 5. What one can deduce easily however is that there was a
massive increase of labour time during the two industrial revolutions. The first industrial
revolution extends from 1760 up to 1840, while the second one extends from 1840 up to 1914
and the beginning of the Great War. Both eras brought a significant change in working
hours; pre-industrial revolution peasants increased their labour time (Blanchard, 1978) from
180 days per year and 11 hours per day, to almost full year working and a 69-hour week
and after the first revolution (Woytinsky, 1935). The almost genocidal effects of working
hours were mitigated by a set of laws during the second industrial revolution, which initially
limited hours of work to 12 per day for British factory workers and to 8 hours per day for
US Federal employees. Starting from what can be considered the beginning of the second
industrial revolution (1870), data shows a consistent drop of working hours (Huberman &
Minns, 2007). This trend indeed lasted until 1980, when we observe a rise in working hours
again, especially in the new world (Huberman & Minns, 2007).
This tendency of decreasing work hours from 1870 onwards led important economic
thinkers to believe that further reduction were ahead, with Keynes famously predicting a
four-hour working day (the equivalent of a 20-hour working week). This prediction never
materialised, although arguably the material conditions (e.g. worker productivity, techno-
logical innovations etc) have all shown significant gains. In the socialist world, the same set
of optimism permeated the economic thinking, with soviet leadership (Stalin, 1952) aiming
for (but never delivering) 5 hour workdays. The crisis of 1970s, the advent of the internet,
lifestyle choices, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the further collapse of the labour
movement have proved almost impossible to predict (Friedman, 2015).
2.3 Money Power
So what do the the upper echelons of society do with the labour-power and natural resources
they consume? A part is arguably spent on maintaining idleness and in the consumption
and creation of rare delicacies (Veblen, 1899; Kapur, Macleod, & Singh, 2005), but this
seems a rather degenerate state. A much more important aspect is the reshaping of society,
and thus reality, in their own desires, arguably playing the role of Level 1 machines. This
transformation of labour-power to social power forms the core of our societies, and there is
no evidence that any change is to expected in this front. Furthermore, the drive for more
automation is going to be intensified, as it plays nicely with the power fantasies, ambitions
and fetishes of certain elites, while it actually increases and transforms production - as has
done for centuries.
2.4 Escape to Nature
Agricultural production is no longer something a large part of humanity can or aspires to
do - and we have seen a decline in agricultural employment (Simon, Beisner, & Phelps,
1995), a trend more pronounced in advanced economies. In practical terms, this means an
5. See http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/worktime/hours_workweek.html for some dis-
cussion and some very relevant references.
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inability of large parts of the population to both deal and get involved in a direct exchange
with nature. Further improvements in agricultural robots will hasten this trend.
3. The Case for Increased Working Hours
We have seen four different historical trends/facts : a) automation has been identified as
a normal socio-economic process, b) working hours have been going up, with no labour
movement to act as a counter-balance, c) work is still needed and there is going to be a
push for more automation and d) there is no longer the possibility of an escape towards
subsistence farming. To put it in other words, the current situation is not unique, there is
a trend, there are reasons to believe the it will continue and there is no obvious way to stop
it.
Given our arguments above, we think the logical outcome of improved automation is
the increase in working hours, a continuation of an existing trend. The effect might be as
dramatic as during the first industrial revolution, with the same adverse societal effects,
while at the same time bringing global production to new heights.
4. Discussion
There is a very clear case to be made that the most probable future for labour is more
labour, in direct competitions with machines for survival. Adverse health conditions related
to overwork will become common place (e.g. see McCurry (2017)), while businesses will
advertise for 70+ work-hour weeks as normal6. It is highly unlikely that anything can
revert this trend, but two possible scenarios still exist. The first scenario is war at a global
scale, where productive forces are destroyed to such an extent that rebuilding and rethinking
constitutes a necessity. Given the existence of nuclear weapons, something like this is highly
unlikely. The second scenario is some abrupt change in social relationships, which cannot
be predicted at the moment - movements that call for a reduction in working hours are
fringe at best, while the dominance of capital over labour is almost absolute.
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